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Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam |  | Author: John A. Nagl
Creator: Peter J. Schoomaker
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
Category: Book
List Price: $17.00
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Seller: dreambooksco
Rating:  56 reviews
Sales Rank: 14479
Media: Paperback
Edition: 1
Pages: 280
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7
Dimensions (in): 8.9 x 6 x 0.6
ISBN: 0226567702
Dewey Decimal Number: 959.504
EAN: 9780226567709
ASIN: 0226567702
Publication Date: September 15, 2005
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq—considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975.
In examining these two events, Nagl—the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass—argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency.
With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
(20060115)
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| Customer Reviews:
Showing reviews 1-5 of 56
 Required Reading April 21, 2010
Hoke (USA)
This book is required reading in counter insurgency courses and courses on American foreign policy. There is a very good reason in that it is an excellent primer on the problems the U.S. has faced in dealing with small wars. The U.S. Army and citizenry has become accustomed to large war campaigns that are measured in terms of land and fatalities. Opponents facing the U.S. have learned the weaknesses inherent in large institutions and found ways to effectively exploit them. This book compares and contrasts the British efforts to fight the communist insurgency in Malaysia with those of the U.S. in Vietnam. The focus of the book is that the British history of policing its territories has left its military better positioned to learn and adapt to insurgency whereas the culture of the U.S. military has failed to do this.
This book was written prior to the current Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and its lessons have since been incorporated into U.S. strategy. The successes the U.S. has enjoyed in these campaigns have come about because it has started to learn the lessons outlined in this book.
 Learning Organization May 29, 2009
Joseph Grebmeier (King City, CA USA)
The author review military doctrine in dealing with local insurgencies. He compares the British experience in Malaysia and the American experience in Viet Nam. The focus on the book is in describing a "learning organization." This is one that adapts and learns; that evolves to meet new challenges. While this applies in combat, it also has value in all organizations that deal with challenges.
This is an excellent companion book to the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
Important lessons for today March 28, 2009
Eric V. Weil (New York City)
Colonel Nagl has written one of the best books on recent military history I have yet to read. He examines the past experiences in Vietnam and Malaya, pointing out what the failures and success of those experiences and translates them into an astounding piece of history for the present and the future. It is a blueprint for what to do and what not to do, given the current and quite likely future of warfare. It is a telling book by a combat leader. He writes with exceptional clarity and he work is replete with references and the bibliography is extraordinary. Everyone should read this book. In addition he is also the author of the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgeny Field Manual, another excellent and detailed book on COIN operations.
Refreshingly introspective and honest March 25, 2009
AcornMan (Denver, CO)
As a military history buff I feel like I have a good understanding of the dynamics of the Vietnam War and the reasons for the outcome from the perspective of the United States. However, Colonel Nagl puts the whole issue in a much more focused perspective than anything else I have ever read. (A quick note: Although the book addresses the British experience in Malaya and the US experience in Vietnam, the clear objective is to better understand Vietnam by comparing and contrasting it to Malaya. Hence, my focus here on Vietnam). By taking a methodical, academic approach, this book sets forth very specific criteria by which to measure the performance of the British and US militaries, delivering a well thought out and rational discussion of what must be done to counter an insurgency and how Britain and the US fared in their respective conflicts. More than that, it explains why the outcomes of Malaya and Vietnam were so different, not just from a tactical or strategic perspective, but also in terms of the overall structure and philosophy of the British and US armies. Much has been written about why the US failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, but I found this book to be far more thorough and insightful - and therefore more credible - than anything else out there.
On another note, it is extremely refreshing and encouraging to see this level of introspection and intellectual rigor from an Army officer, something I have noticed more and more in today's Army. To lead the US military into the future and prepare its personnel for the conflicts of today and tomorrow, this is precisely the kind of thoughtful self-examination and open inquisitiveness that officers will need to demonstrate.
Is the U. S. Army a learning institution ? December 15, 2008
Michael A Neulander (VA)
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs. The purpose of John A. Nagl's book was to explore the reasons why the British army was able to change its strategy and tactics of war fighting in order to successfully conduct a counterinsurgency operation in Malaya from 1948 through 1960, and why the U. S. army failed in its counterinsurgency challenge in Vietnam from 1950 through 1973, because its leaders clung to their strategy and tactics of annihilation. Nagl's thesis, for which he cogently argued in his book, was that the answer lied in the "organizational culture" differences between the British and U. S. armies. "The organizational culture of the British army allowed it to learn how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency, whereas the organizational culture of the U.S. Army prevented a similar organizational learning process during and after the Vietnam War" (213).
As Nagl so aptly pointed out, the British army was structured on a regimental system whereby soldiers and officers served together for their whole careers, which gave them several advantages to learn and improve their war fighting skills. Units could quickly change their tactics and training methods as they found the counterinsurgency techniques that brought them mission success in the field. The British also learned from over one hundred years of colonial rule around the globe, that it was prudent to cultivate the trust and listen to the local populace. Since the British army was small, its senior leadership was in closer contact with the military operations in Malaya and more readily willing to listen to their junior officers' advice. In sharp contrast, Nagl argued that the institutional culture of the U.S. Army was too intransigent to change its learning cycle. "An army that saw its raison d'etre as winning wars through the application of firepower and maneuver to annihilate enemy forces simply could not conceive of another kind of war in which its weapons, technology, and organization not only could not destroy the enemy, but usually could not even find or identify him" (198).
No doubt, Nagl was correct in implying that had the U.S. commanders listened to the advice of those who called for using counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam, they may have faired better. However, it is important to note that the British failed in conducting a successful counterinsurgency in Palestine, mainly because they could not win the trust of the Jews to help them since virtually the entire Jewish population were united in their quest for independence. Similarly, the North Vietnamese Communists under the inspired leadership of Ho Chi Minh, commanded the respect and support of probably more of the Vietnamese populace than the U.S. or the intolerably corrupt government of the South Vietnamese could ever hope to win over. Thus, another lesson for governments to learn is to carefully pick and choose when and where to militarily intervene.
Recommended reading for anyone interested in American history and military history.
Showing reviews 1-5 of 56
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